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Abstract
This Note argues that U.S. courts should examine requests for international judicial assistance
from non-U.S. courts by using a standard that looks to both the characteristics of the requesting
party and the nature of the non-U.S. proceeding. Part I discusses international judicial assistance
generally and examines the 1964 amendments to the Judicial Assistance Statute. Part II of this
Note details the different approaches by which the U.S. circuit courts have dealt with the deletion
of the word “pending” from the amended Statute. Part III suggests that U.S. courts responding to
letters rogatory should uniformly institute a two-part test that reflects not only the congressional
intent and public policy concerns that prompted the 1964 amendments, but that also acknowledges
the countervailing privacy interests of U.S. residents subjected to such requests. First, courts
should look to whether the non-U.S. party is a tribunal or an interested party. If an adjudica-
tory tribunal is the source of the judicial assistance request, a lesser degree of development of the
non-U.S. proceeding should be required for the granting of assistance. If an interested person,
however, is the source of the request, the non-U.S. party should be required to show a more devel-
oped non-U.S. proceeding before assistance is granted. This Note concludes that, in light of the
present confusion over prevailing approaches to the “non-pending” standards, courts should adopt
a uniform standard that negotiates a middle path between granting all requests for international
judicial assistance and refusing requests for assistance from all but the most advanced non-U.S.
proceedings.
A PROPOSED UNIFORM STANDARD FOR U.S. COURTS
IN GRANTING REQUESTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, courts have sought assistance from judicial
bodies in foreign jurisdictions when faced with the need for
discovery proceedings outside their national jurisdictions.'
The letter rogatory, or letter of request, is one method by
which courts request international judicial assistance.2
Although a grant of international judicial assistance may en-
courage comity between nations and international coopera-
tion, it may also endanger residents' privacy rights.3 Often a
degree of self-interest informs such perspectives, because a
country that refuses a request today might be refused its own
request tomorrow.4
1. See generally Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos
and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953) (discussing background, methods,
and problems in judicial assistance).
2. See, e.g., The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941) (defining letters roga-
tory as "the medium . .. whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts,
requests another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court
procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the ad-
ministration of justice in the former country"); see also John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry
Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 134 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985) (defining letters rogatory);Jones, supra
note 1, at 515-16 (defining international judicial assistance and discussing nomencla-
ture in non-U.S. jurisdictions).
3. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. at 820 (stating that letters rogatory are usually
granted because of comity between nations); Note, Reciprocity for Letters Rogatory Under
the Judicial Code, 58 YALE L.J. 1193, 1194 (1949) (noting that letters rogatory are "de-
vice[s] of direct international judicial cooperation" that depend on comity for their
effectiveness). But see In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for
the Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that U.S.
residents' privacy rights need protection and consequently denying judicial assist-
ance); Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1015, 1018 & n. 19 (1965) (noting other domestic interests "worthy of protection" to
justify denying international judicial assistance include "protecting a nation's resi-
dents against physical force or the threat thereof, and the safeguarding of military or
other state secrets").
4. Petition of the Comm'r for Reh'g and Suggestion for Reh'g En Banc at 6-7, In
re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Republic
of Braz., 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6229) (quoting U.S. Department of
State letter brief to Second Circuit panel dated 3/28/91) [hereinafter Letter Brief];
see Smit, supra note 3, at 1020 n.30 (stating that "American refusal to process foreign
letters rogatory was not helping to improve the U.S. balance of payments" and not-
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In 1964, the U.S. Congress amended the international ju-
dicial assistance statute (the "Judicial Assistance Statute" or
"Statute"), 5 a codification of procedures for dealing with other
nations' requests for judicial assistance. The 1964 amend-
ments were part of a general bill dealing with judicial proce-
dures in litigation with international aspects. 6 These amend-
ments sought to encourage reciprocity in the exchange of in-
formation between the U.S. and other countries and to
reaffirm the U.S. district courts' broad discretion to consider
these requests. 7 In deciding whether to grant requests for in-
ing financial incentives prompted 1964 amendments that broadened judicial assist-
ance legislation).
5. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. 88-619, § 9(a), 78 Stat. 997 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) [hereinafter the Judicial Assistance Statute or the Stat-
ute]. The Statute, in pertinent part, provides for
[aissistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before
such tribunals.
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.
The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any
interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given,
or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by
the court .... The order may prescribe the practice and procedure ... for
taking the testimony .... To the extent that the order does not prescribe
otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or
other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
6. 110 CONG. REC. 596-99, 22,857 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3782-83.
7. S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788-90; H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-9 (1963).
Both reports noted that
[s]ubsection (a) of the proposed revised section 1782 [the Judicial Assist-
ance Statute] also describes the foreign proceedings in connection with
which U.S. judicial assistance may be granted. A rather large number of
requests for assistance emanate from investigating magistrates. The word
"tribunal" is used to make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceed-
ings before conventional courts. For example, it is intended that the court
have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before
investigating magistrates in foreign countries. In view of the constant
growth of administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world,
the necessity for obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impel-
ling in proceedings before a foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial
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ternational judicial assistance, two factors that the U.S. courts
consider include the nature of the requesting party and the
stage of development of the non-U.S. proceeding.8 As a result
of this broad discretion, courts disagree over whether a non-
U.S. proceeding must be pending, and if they do not, to what
degree the non-U.S. proceeding must have developed before
judicial assistance may be granted by a U.S. district court.9
This Note argues that U.S. courts should examine re-
quests for international judicial assistance from non-U.S.
courts by using a standard that looks to both the characteristics
of the requesting party and the nature of the non-U.S. pro-
ceeding. Part I discusses international judicial assistance gen-
erally and examines the 1964 amendments to the Judicial
Assistance Statute. Part II of this Note details the different ap-
proaches by which the U.S. circuit courts have dealt with the
deletion of the word "pending" from the amended Statute.
Part III suggests that U.S. courts responding to letters roga-
tory should uniformly institute a two-part test that reflects not
only the congressional intent and public policy concerns that
prompted the 1964 amendments, but that also acknowledges
the countervailing privacy interests of U.S. residents subjected
to such requests. First, courts should look to whether the non-
U.S. party is a tribunal or an interested party. If an adjudica-
tory tribunal is the source of the judicial assistance request, a
lesser degree of development of the non-U.S. proceeding
should be required for the granting of assistance. If an inter-
ested person, however, is the source of the request, the non-
U.S. party should be required to show a more developed non-
U.S. proceeding before assistance is granted. This Note con-
cludes that, in light of the present confusion over prevailing
approaches to the "non-pending" standards, courts should
adopt a uniform standard that negotiates a middle path be-
tween granting all requests for international judicial assistance
agency as in proceedings before a conventional foreign court. Subsection
(a) therefore provides the possibility of U.S. judicial assistance in connection
with all such proceedings.
S. REP. No. 1580, at 7, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788 (citations omitted);
H.R. REP. No. 1052, at 9 (citations omitted).
8. S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-8, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788.
9. See infra notes 103-42 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of
deletion of "pending" from Statute).
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and refusing requests for assistance from all but the most ad-
vanced non-U.S. proceedings.
I. INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
A. Background of the U.S. International Judicial Assistance Statute
When a. non-U.S. party needs information for litigation
outside of the United States and a witness resident in the U.S.
refuses to cooperate voluntarily, the non-U.S. party may re-
quest international judicial assistance from the U.S. district
court in the district in which the witness resides.' 0 The infor-
mation sought may include "testimony or statement ... a doc-
ument or other thing."" Such international judicial assistance
often is requested in tax and currency control cases and, to a
lesser extent, in criminal prosecutions. 12
A party may pursue international judicial assistance in the
United States through diplomatic channels, according to inter-
national law, or under federal or state statutes.' 3 Some nations
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988). The Statute includes a provision for voluntary
production of evidence. Id. § 1782(b).
11. Id. § 1782(a). The "other thing" sought under the Statute may be a blood
sample, for example, for use in a paternity suit. See In re Letters Rogatory from the
City of Haugesund, Nor., 497 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974); accord In re Letter of Request
from the Local Court of Pforzheim, 130 F.R.D. 363 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
12. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991) (tax investigation); Young
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989) (currency investiga-
tion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of
Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11 th Cir. 1988) (currency investiga-
tion), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989);
Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (currency investigation); In re
Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1967) (tax investigation); In re Application of Sumar, 123 F.R.D. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (bank records requested for Argentine criminal fraud proceeding);
In re Request for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul Dist. Criminal Court, Seoul, Ko-
rea, 428 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (currency investigation), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1977); see also Philip W. Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964-
New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J. B.
Ass'N D.C. 24, 32 (1965) (discussing letters rogatory in criminal proceedings); Brian
E. Bomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Much Ado About 1782: A Look at Recent Problems with
Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 432 & nn.10-11 (1989) (discussing expansion of inter-
national judicial assistance to include criminal proceedings).13. BRUNO A. RiSTAU, I INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE CIVIL AND COM-
MERCIAL §§ 2-2-1, 2-2-4, 5-2-7 (1990). The non-U.S. party may use diplomatic chan-
nels, and send the request to the Department of State, which transmits the request to
the appropriate authority or agency. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a)
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have signed treaties to facilitate international discovery.' 4 In
1970, the United States signed the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the
"Hague Convention"), a treaty which to some extent over-
lapped the expanded Judicial Assistance Statute. Unlike the
Statute, the Hague Convention is limited to civil or commercial
matters.' 5 Furthermore, the Statute is broader with regard to
standing and to the parties permitted to utilize the Statute.' 6
Because the Hague Convention is non-exclusive in the United
States for non-U.S. litigants seeking evidence for use abroad,
U.S. practice under the Judicial Assistance Statute is un-
changed. '
7
(1991); see Note,judicial Assistance for the Foreign "Tribunal," 1968 DUKE L.J. 981, 982.
A letter rogatory should be accompanied by an English translation. 22 C.F.R.
§ 92.67(b) (1991); Morris H. Deutsch, Judicial Assistance: Obtaining Evidence in the
United States, Under28 U.S.C. § 1782,for Use in a Foreign or International Tribunal, 5 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 175, 181 (1982); see UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURE ACT § 3.02, 13 U.L.A. 492 (1980) (proposed state statute addressing re-
quests for international judicial assistance); see also RISTAU, supra, at 36-37; Jones,
supra note 1, at 484.
14. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
15. Id. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241; see also Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at
433 n.13.
16. Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. I, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at
241; see, e.g., Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 433 n.13; Deutsch, supra note 13, at
179-81 nn.24-28.
17. See, e.g., Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 539-40 (1987) (holding that Hague Convention was non-exclu-
sive); see also RIsTAU, supra note 13, at 227. However, Mr. Ristau argues that if a non-
U.S. litigant seeks evidence under the Hague Convention, the district court's discre-
tion regarding letters rogatory is removed. Id. at 227-28. But see Philip Amram,
United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 104, 105 (1973) (stating that ratification of Hague Convention would effect
"no major changes in U.S. procedure [nor require any] changes in U.S. legislation or
rules"). Mr. Amram's statement was repeated at the Senate advice and consent hear-
ings. S. EXEC. REP. No. 92-95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972); RisTAU, supra note 13, at
228 n.83.
In Sociit6 Nationale, the Court noted that "the scope of American discovery is
often significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions." Sociti Nationale,
482 U.S. at 542; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 530-32. Indeed, "discovery conducted
by the parties, as is common in the United States, is alien to the legal systems of civil-
law nations, which typically regard evidence gathering as a judicial function." Socite
Nationale, 482 U.S. at 550 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Many civil law courts do not allow extensive pre-trial discovery, unlike those in the
United States. See, e.g., id. at 526 n.6 (discussing French blocking statute which pro-
hibits some kinds of discovery requests); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany
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In the United States, litigation involving discovery for use
in non-U.S. courts or tribunals has largely involved the Judicial
Assistance Statute.' 8 If a non-U.S. party seeks information
from a cooperative witness, the non-U.S. party may appoint a
commission.' 9 A commission does not act through the U.S.
district courts, but pursues the evidence itself.20 However, if
the U.S. witness will not cooperate voluntarily, the non-U.S.
party can apply to the district courts for aid by sending a letter
21rogatory.
as Amicus Curiae at 13-17, Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. United
States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (discussing blocking statutes).
Furthermore, civil law jurisdictions require specific, often formal, questions. See, e.g.,
Jones, supra note 1, at 530-31 (discussing civil law procedural problems); Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15-16, Societi Nationale
(No. 85-1695) (discussing specifics of French discovery). Therefore, a non-U.S. at-
torney accustomed to continental discovery processes and unfamiliar with U.S. dis-
covery rules, is less likely to engage in any "fishing expeditions," whereas his U.S.
counterpart, accustomed to broad pretrial discovery, takes the opposite approach.
See RIsTAU, supra note 13, at 231. Comity, therefore, is not served by a course of
action that renders resort to the Hague Convention optional, because it does not
"further[ ] ... the development of an ordered international system." SociitiNationale,
482 U.S. at 567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International
Proceedings, 30 VA.J. INT'L L. 597, 599 (1990). U.S. litigation and commentary on the
Hague Convention has focused on using the treaty to obtain evidence that is avail-
able outside of the United States for use in U.S. proceedings. See, e.g., Socie'ti Nation-
ale, 482 U.S. 522 (allowing U.S. plaintiffs access to information from foreign national
that was party to litigation under Hague Convention).
19. United States v. Mosby, 133 U.S. 273, 282 (1890) (discussing unofficial con-
sular acts including execution of commission for taking testimony under authority of
state or territorial tribunal).
20. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 17 F. Cas. 1340, 1341 n.2 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816)
(No. 10,116) (discussing denial of commission's request for assistance in Havana be-
cause of perceived interference with judiciary's rights); Werner Galleski, Address, in
LETrERS ROGATORY-A SYMPOSiUM 35-43 (Bernard A. Grossman ed., 1956) (discuss-
ing difficulties inherent in commissions); Stahr, supra note 18, at 600 n.13 (stating
alternative to letter rogatory is commission); Note, supra note 3, at 1193-94 (compar-
ing commissions and letters rogatory with commentary on problems inherent in com-
mission). A commission may be executed only with willing witnesses, because the
commission has no access to judicial procedures to enforce compliance with discov-
ery requests. Galleski, supra, at 37.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a), (c) (1991); see, e.g., Nelson,
17 F. Cas. at 1341 (discussing letters rogatory issued from U.S. district court to Ha-
vana tribunal when authorities prevented execution of commission); see also RISTAU,
supra note 13, at 38-39 (discussing procedure and suggesting strongly that non-U.S.
parties employ an attorney to pursue discovery); Note, supra note 13, at 982 (discuss-
ing procedures of international judicial assistance). According to the Advisory Com-
mittee notes, a party should issue both a commission and a letter rogatory requesting
international judicial assistance, providing that the letter rogatory is to be executed if
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International judicial assistance by use of letters rogatory
has been available in the United States by statute since 1855.22
Letters rogatory can be more effective than commissions
because the executing courts have recourse to their own proce-
dures to compel recalcitrant or reluctant witnesses to comply
with their judicial decrees.2 3  The evidence may be in-
admissable in the non-U.S. proceeding, however, due to proce-
dural differences between the jurisdictions and the fact that the
petitioned courts may employ their own procedures to procure
the requested evidence.24
Under the Judicial Assistance Statute, a request for assist-
ance may be sent either by a non-U.S. tribunal or court or by
an interested person.25 The non-U.S. individual files a "sec-
the commission is unable to obtain the necessary information. FED. R. Civ. P. 28
advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment. The non-U.S. party may set forth its
request in any written form. 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(c) (1991); RiSTAU, supra note 13, at
38. Civil law courts can use letters rogatory for purposes other than the production
of evidence. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory from the City of Haugesund, Nor., 497
F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974) (using letters rogatory to give notice of suit); Stahr, supra
note 18, at 600 n.12 (citing cases that deal with alternative civil law uses for letters
rogatory). But see In re Request from L. Kasper-Ansermet, 123 F.R.D. 622 (D.NJ.
1990) (holding that Swiss magistrate cannot use discovery statute to pronounce in-
dictment at deposition).
22. Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) [hereinafter Act of 1855]. The Act of 1855 granted
broad powers to U.S. circuit courts to compel witnesses to appear in court and to be
deposed as though the witnesses were in a U.S. judicial proceeding. Id. The Act of
1855 addressed requests from non-U.S. courts and permitted only the gathering of
testimony. Id. The Act of 1855, however, was omitted from the index of the Federal
Register for several years and then ignored by the federal courts. See Jones, supra
note 1, at 540-41.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a) (1991). See generally Jones,
supra note I (discussing problems with letters rogatory, including lengthy delays). See
also Deutsch, supra note 13, at 176-79 (discussing procedural problems with letters
rogatory, including delays); Stahr, supra note 18, at 600 n. 13 (comparing letters roga-
tory and commissions). By the 1964 amendment, Congress hoped to "provid[e] eq-
uitable and efficacious procedures" of international judicial assistance. S. REP. No.
1580, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3783; H.R. REP. No. 1052,
supra note 7, at 4.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (giving district court discretion to prescribe
procedure and, if not prescribed, providing that evidence be taken in accordance
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 22 C.F.R. § 92.6 7 (a) (1991); see, e.g., In re
Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 692-
93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing English court's request that evidence be taken ac-
cording to English procedure); see also Stahr, supra note 18, at 600 n.13.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (providing that "any interested person" may
pursue discovery).
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tion 1782" request with the applicable U.S. district court,26 or
the non-U.S. tribunal or court requests assistance from the dis-
trict court through a letter rogatory.27 If the U.S. court initially
denies either request, it returns the request to the non-U.S.
party, which may choose to modify the request and send it back
to the U.S. court.28
If the U.S. district court decides to grant assistance to the
non-U.S. party, it issues an order appointing an individual
whose task is to execute the letter rogatory. 29 The district
court may order an individual to comply with the evidentiary
request, often by subpoena.3 0 If the subpoenaed party, or the
party that is being investigated, believes that the information
should not be released, it may move to vacate the court order
and quash the subpoena.3 '
Since the Statute's enactment in 1855, Congress has vacil-
lated over the extent to which information should be available
for use in litigation outside the United States, and over the par-
ties to whom such information should be accessible.32 Initially,
the Statute espoused an expansive view towards granting inter-
26. Id.; see supra note 5 (quoting text of Statute with relevant procedure). If the
witness is reluctant to testify or if there is a problem under state law regarding the
evidence sought, the non-U.S. party must resort to the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
(1988); see RIsTAu, supra note 13, at 38.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a) (1991); Bomstein & Levitt,
supra note 12, at 434; Deutsch, supra note 13, at 179.
28. Cf 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(d) (1991); Jones, supra note 1, at 539.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a) (1991); see, e.g., RIsTAu,
supra note 13, at 45. The individual is referred to as a Commissioner, and may be a
U.S. Magistrate, an Assistant U.S. Attorney, a court clerk, a private attorney, a court
reporter, a non-U.S. consular official, or a non-U.S. judge. Id. at 45; see also id. at 41
(reproducing copy of order); Lucien LeLievre, Address, in LETrERS ROGATORY-A
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 20, at 9-21 (discussing U.S. procedure and appointment of
commissioner).
30. LeLievre, supra note 29, at 12-13.
31. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the
Federative Republic of Braz., 687 F. Supp. 880, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y.) (concerning Pana-
manian corporations that moved to quash subpoenas seeking bank records allegedly
relating to embezzler), modified, 700 F. Supp. 723 (1988), stay granted, 130 F.R.D. 283
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Letter of Request forJudi-
cial Assistance from the Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince, Republic of Haiti, 669 F.
Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (concerning former government official who moved to
quash subpoenas seeking bank records allegedly relating to criminal activity while
official was in office).
32. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) with Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10
Stat. 630 (1855) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) and Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769-70 (1863) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
1991-1992]
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national requests for judicial assistance. 3 A later version of
the Statute required that the requested information be used in
a suit for the recovery of money or property, and that the gov-
ernment of the court requesting assistance be a party to the
litigation or have an interest in the suit.3 4 The revised Statute
thus severely limited the scope of the Judicial Assistance Stat-
ute.3 5 After World War II, Congress began to expand the
scope of the Statute once again.3 6
B. The 1964 Amendment and Its Impact
In 1964, Congress made four changes to the Judicial
(1988)) and supra note 22 and infra note 34. See, e.g., Stahr, supra note 18, at 600-05
(discussing development of international Judicial Assistance Statute).
33. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) with Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10
Stat. 630 (1855) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) and Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769-70 (1863) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
(1988)) and supra note 22 and infra note 34. See, e.g., Stahr, supra note 18, at 600-05
(discussing development of international Judicial Assistance Statute).
34. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769-70 (1863) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)). Indeed, one commentator noted that in the period
from 1863 to 1948, "federal courts ... generally denied discovery for use abroad,
relying on the limits of the 1863 Act, and dismissing the 1855 Act as procedural. In
no reported federal case from this period was discovery for use abroad allowed."
Stahr, supra note 18, at 601-02 (citations omitted). By 1949, congressional sentiment
had begun to return to a more expansive view of international judicial assistance. See
infra note 36 (quoting, in pertinent part, 1948 version of Statute).
For a complete list of the texts of the international Judicial Assistance Statutes
and their subsequent amendments, see the Appendix in In re Letter Rogatory from
the Justice Court, District of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562, 566-69 (6th Cir. 1975).
35. See In re Spanish Consul's Petition, 22 F. Cas. 854, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No.
13,202) (denying assistance because request did not fit within narrow confines of
1855 Act or 1863 Act); see also Jones, supra note 1, at 540 (discussing pre-1948 ver-
sions of Judicial Assistance Statute).
36. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 949 (1948) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)). The 1948 Statute provided for
[t]estimony for use in a foreign country.
The deposition of any witness residing within the United States to be
used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with which
the United States is at peace may be taken before a person authorized to
administer oaths designated by the district court of any district where the
witness resides or may be found.
The practice and procedure in taking such depositions shall conform
generally to the practice and procedure for taking depositions to be used in
courts of the United States.
Id. The Statute was further amended in 1949 to state that "[t]he deposition of any
witness within the United States to be used in any judicial proceeding pending in any
court." Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)).
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Assistance Statute in an attempt to broaden the scope of inter-
national judicial assistance and to spur reciprocity. 7 First,
Congress expanded the category of information that could be
requested from a court to include "testimony or [a] statement
or . . . a document or other thing."'3 8 Second, it replaced a
"judicial proceeding" with "a proceeding in a foreign or inter-
national tribunal."' 39 Third, Congress broadened the statutory
definition of the requesting body from a "court" to a "foreign
or international tribunal or . . . any interested person."40
Fourth, Congress deleted the adjective "pending," which had
previously modified the prior "judicial proceeding." '4'
While commentators and courts have disputed the signifi-
cance of the changes, most agree that by enacting the 1964
amendments Congress intended to broaden the ambit of the
Judicial Assistance Statute.42 However, the deletion of the
"pending" requirement in addition to the expanded category
of the requesting fora has proven troublesome for U.S. courts
in deciding whether to grant international judicial assistance.4 3
U.S. courts have experienced difficulty in interpreting the
congressional intent expressed in the 1964 amendments be-
cause Congress did not discuss the language of the amend-
ments.44 Congress did not redraft the Statute, nor address the
37. S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788;
H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 1-3, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792-94.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); see, e.g., Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 433-
34; Stahr, supra note 18, at 604-05. The 1964 expansion of the types of information
available by statute was the first since the Act of 1855 was adopted. Stahr, supra note
18, at 604-05.
39. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
40. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
41. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)), with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988). See Born-
stein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 438-40; Stahr, supra note 18, at 623-24.
42. Compare In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1976) (no pending procedure necessary) with In re Request for Int'l
Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d
702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) (proceeding must be imminent); see also Bomstein & Levitt,
supra note 12, at 431; Deutsch, supra note 13, at 178; Smit, supra note 3, at 1018;
Stahr, supra note 18, at 604; Note, supra note 13, at 985.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 103- 42 (discussing split among U.S. circuit
courts regarding interpretation of deletion of "pending" from Statute).
44. 110 CONG. REC. 596-97 (1964) (discussing only whether U.S. citizens could
be compelled to testify in non-U.S. litigation); see, e.g., Amram, supra note 12, at 26
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individual changes suggested.45 Instead, Congress incorpo-
rated as legislative history the Fourth Annual Report of the
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure.46
Courts have focused on the individual changes, and some
courts and commentators argue that this absence of congres-
sional debate reflects an absence of congressional intent.47
Consequently, the Senate and House Reports are not disposi-
tive, and should not control an interpretation of the amended
Statute. However, although the specific deletion of the word
"pending" was unaccompanied by congressional comment, the
Statute as a whole was aimed at "improv[ing] practices of in-
ternational cooperation in litigation" and encouraging reci-
procity from other countries in international judicial assistance
proceedings.48 Therefore, any reading of the Statute should
be done in the context of the intent behind the Statute as a
whole, not only in light of the intent behind individual textual
changes.
1. The Characteristics of the Requesting Party
The 1964 amendments broadened the scope of the Stat-
ute by replacing the phrase, "a judicial proceeding," with the
phrase "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. 49
The phrase "tribunal," chosen for its "neutral and encompass-
ing" character, therefore widened the range of parties that may
pursue discovery in U.S. courts for information to be used
outside the United States."0 This phrase admits quasi-judicial
(noting that law as signed was almost identical to original recommendations); Born-
stein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 439 (stating that Congress did not redraft Statute, but
only adopted committee report); Note, supra note 13, at 984 (commenting that Con-
gress enacted Commission report "verbatim").
45. See 110 CONG. REC. 596-99, 22,857 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3782, 3782-83.
46. H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); see 110 CONG. REC. 596-98,
22,857 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3782-83; see also Bomstein & Lev-
itt, supra note 12, at 439. For more on the Commission, see, e.g., Amram, supra note
12, at 24-25; Smit, supra note 3, at 1015-17 & n. 11.
47. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that deletion
of word "pending" from Statute "might have been inadvertent"); Bomstein & Levitt,
supra note 12, at 439.
48. 110 CONG. REC. 22,857 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782.
49. Compare supra note 36 (quoting text of 1948 Statute) with supra note 5 (quot-
ing text of 1964 Statute).
50. Smit, supra note 3, at 1021 n.36.
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and administrative proceedings that were not included under
the prior versions of the Statute.5' For example, the Statute
now encompasses the Frenchjuge dinstruction, an official who
conducts investigations, interviews witnesses and the accused,
compiles a dossier of all of the evidence pertaining to an investi-
gation, and evaluates evidence to determine whether the pros-
ecution should proceed.52 Although the amended Statute has
a wider reach than its predecessors, it is not wholly un-
restricted. 3 The requesting party must still fit within the stat-
utory scheme in order to receive the requested information. 4
a. A "Foreign or International Tribunal"
as Requesting Party
The scope of the "tribunal" provision5 5 in the 1964
amendment was first interpreted by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Direc-
tor of Inspection of the Government of India.56 The Director in India
sought an individual's bank records to determine a tax assess-
ment that was at issue in Indian proceedings.57 In India, the
Second Circuit acknowledged the broader import of a "tribu-
nal" as opposed to a "judicial proceeding," but found that the
51. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-8, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3788-89 (including investigating magistrates under statutory umbrella).
52. A.E. Anton, L'Instruction Criminele, 9 AM.J. CoMp. L. 441, 442 (1960); see also
Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 441. A French juge dinstruction acts in a fashion
"somewhat parallel" to the grand jury in the Anglo-American legal system. In re
Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d
1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1967). Thejuge d'instruction oversees the investigation and exam-
ines the witnesses. Id. However, "[t]hejuge dinstruction represents neither the inter-
est of the police nor that of the state prosecutors, the parquet, and his aim is simply to
ensure that justice is done." Anton, supra, at 443. Before the 1964 amendments,
investigations of French juges dinstruction "were only dubiously within" the Statute.
India, 385 F.2d at 1020. A 1956 paper noted that about half of the letters rogatory
received were from juges d'instruction. Id. But see Note, supra note 13, at 986-93 (criti-
cizing Second Circuit's interpretation of Statute and description of French juge
d'instruction as example of "tribunal").
53. See India, 385 F.2d at 1021 (noting "that concept [of a tribunal] is not so
broad as to include all the plethora of administrators whose decisions affect private
parties and who are not entitled to act arbitrarily").
54. Id. at 1020.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (referring to "request made ... by a foreign or
international tribunal").
56. 385 F.2d 1017 (2d. Cir. 1967).
57. Id. at 1017-18.
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tribunal requirement still limited parties' access to discovery.58
The Second Circuit held that an Indian Income Tax officer was
not a "tribunal" within the meaning of the Statute.59 A tribu-
nal, according to the court, was adjudicatory in nature, and
maintained a certain amount of objectivity in that its
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions were separate.6 0 The
court held that, unlike an impartial tribunal, the Indian Income
Tax official had an "institutional interest" in a particular re-
sult.6 1 Consequently, because the court decided that the In-
dian Income Tax official had an institutional interest in the
outcome of the proceeding and was not an adjudicatory inves-
tigating magistrate, the court denied assistance.62
A subsequent Second Circuit decision followed the India
standard and denied assistance to the Colombian Superinten-
dent of Exchange Control who, suspecting a violation of Co-
lombia's currency laws, sought access to a suitcase that con-
tained US$250,000 that had been left in a New York airport.6"
The court denied assistance to the Colombian Superintendent
because the Superintendent needed the suitcase to begin the
investigation.' The court concluded that the Superinten-
dent's function was merely investigatory and that he had an
"institutional interest" in the outcome.65
Although the U.S. courts denied judicial assistance in the
aforementioned instances, they did acknowledge the congres-
sional intent to expand the definition of "tribunal" to encom-
58. Id. at 1020. In India, a Director of Inspection had presented letters rogatory
for the District Court in the Southern District of New York pursuant to the Income
Tax Act of the Government of India. Id. at 1017. At the Director's request, the court
appointed a commissioner who moved for the issuance of a subpoena requiring the
New York bank to produce books and papers in response to the letters rogatory. Id.
at 10 17-18. The individual under audit moved to vacate the order, to quash the sub-
poenas, and to deny the Indian Income Tax Officer access to the requested financial
information. Id. at 1018.
59. Id. at 1020-21. The court quoted S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-9,
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788-90. India, 385 F.2d at 1019.
60. In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of the Gov't of India,
385 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1967).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1021-22.
63. Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 443 n.62 (discussing facts of Fonseca not
mentioned in appellate decision).
65. Fonseca, 620 F.2d at 324 (quoting In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director
of Inspection of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1967)).
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pass non-traditional courts and administrative agencies.66 The
nature of a non-U.S. party is not always easily defined, given
the differences among judicial systems that exist world-wide.
To qualify as a tribunal, the requesting party must retain a de-
gree of impartiality-an "adjudicatory connotation. ' 68 U.S.
courts have determined that the requesting party possesses the
requisite adjudicatory characteristics and impartiality when no
connection exists between the governmental interest in prose-
cution and the fact-finder.69
b. An "Interested Party" as Requesting Party
In addition to requests from non-U.S. tribunals, the 1964
version of the Statute provides an alternate route to interna-
tional discovery in U.S. courts. 71 If a "tribunal" is insuffi-
ciently adjudicatory to qualify under the Statute, an "inter-
ested person" or a representative individual may be able to
66. India, 385 F.2d at 1020 (quoting S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-8, re-
printed in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788); see also Fonseca, 620 F.2d at 323 (quoting S. REP.
No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-8, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788).
67. See Jones, supra note 1, at 530-32. Difficulties commonly arise due to the
differences in discovery procedures among common law and civil law countries. Id.
68. Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1980).
69. See, e.g., id. at 323; India, 385 F.2d at 1020; In re Request for Int'l Judicial
Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the Federative Republic of Braz., 687 F. Supp.
880, 884 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 700 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130
F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 474 reporters' note
4 (1986). The Restatement notes that "[t]he critical factor in determining whether a
foreign body qualifies as a tribunal under the [S]tatute is whether both parties to a
litigation are represented before it and receiving fair hearing and impartial determi-
nation." Id. However, some commentators find that this definition is too narrow.
See, e.g., Stahr, supra note 18, at 617-19 (asserting that " 'common meaning' of term
'tribunal' argues against limiting it to courts and other judicial bodies" and conclud-
ing that courts should rely on discretion rather than narrow definition of tribunal).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (allowing "any interested person" to pursue dis-
covery); see, e.g., In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the
U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 689-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (deciding that Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice was an "interested person"); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Minister of Legal Affairs was "interested person" under Statute), cert. denied sub nom.
Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); In re Letter Rogatory from
the Justice Court, Dist. of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 1975) (al-
lowing Canadian prosecutor as "interested person" to pursue discovery for criminal
investigation); see also Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 446 (interpreting "inter-
ested person" as individual with "independent interest in a potential case; or .. .actual
litigant in a pending case").
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pursue the discovery. 7' Persons that might be considered "in-
terested parties" for the purpose of the Statute include an at-
torney for the non-U.S. party, an executor for a non-U.S. es-
tate, a non-U.S. bankruptcy trustee, a non-U.S. consular offi-
cial, and any other non-U.S. official with an interest in the
litigation.72 Moreover, a non-U.S. litigant himself may qualify
as an "interested person. ' 73 For example, although a prosecu-
tor may have an institutional, and therefore, insufficiently adju-
dicatory interest in the outcome of the proceedings, the Stat-
ute nonetheless allows the individual to pursue the compelled
discovery, limited only by the discretion of the district courts. 4
2. The Nature of the Proceedings
In determining whether to grant assistance, U.S. courts
often distinguish between investigations that precede an adju-
dicatory proceeding and the adjudicatory proceedings them-
selves. 75 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In
re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court of Queen's
Bench for Manitoba, Canada76 denied judicial assistance to the
Canadian Commission of Inquiry when it sought to compel
testimony relating to all aspects of a multi-million dollar for-
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); see, e.g., United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 689-90; Tin-
idad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155; In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo,
Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976). But see In re Request for Int'l Judicial
Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 704
(2d Cir. 1991); Stahr, supra note 18, at 618-19.
72. RtsTAu, supra note 13, at 38; see, e.g., Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155
(holding non-U.S. legal affairs minister to be "interested person"); Young v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, No. 87 Civ. 8307, 1988 WL 131302 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1988)
(holding attorney general to be "interested person"), aff'd in part, 882 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Smit, supra note 3, at 1027.
74. See, e.g., In re Letter Rogatory from the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Re-
gional Court of Hamburg, F.R.G., No. M-19-88, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,088, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1988) (holding that "letters rogatory do not lie under [the Stat-
ute] if the applicant is a member of a foreign nation's executive branch"). But see
United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 689-90 (permitting prosecutor to pursue discovery under
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) as interested person); Stahr, supra note 18, at 618-19.
75. See, e.g., In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court of
Queen's Bench for Man., Can., 59 F.R.D. 625, 629 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1973); Brazil, 936 F.2d at 705; Deutsch, supra note 13, at 187; see also
supra notes 103-42 and accompanying text (discussing different interpretations of
deletion of word "pending" from Statute).
76. 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973).
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estry and industrial development project in Manitoba.7 ' The
Ninth Circuit noted that the district court found that the Cana-
dian Commission's purpose in seeking the information was in-
vestigatory and unrelated to a judicial or quasi-judicial contro-
versy. 7a The district court found that the Commission was not
a "tribunal" because it lacked the power "to make a binding
adjudication of facts or law as related to the rights of liti-
gants."' 79 The Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court, held
that the investigation was divorced from a judicial or quasi-ju-
dicial controversy.8 °
Similarly, in In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, To-
kyo, Japan,a' the Ninth Circuit found that the Japanese court
that issued the letters rogatory did not act in an adjudicatory
capacity.8 2 Instead, the court believed that the Japanese court,
which was investigating the alleged payment of bribes to Japa-
nese citizens by a U.S. aircraft corporation, acted in an investi-
gatory capacity at the request of the Tokyo District Public
Prosecutor's Office.8" Although the individuals who were sub-
poenaed were neither defendants nor subjects under investiga-
tion, 4 unlike the decision in Manitoba, the Ninth Circuit in To-
kyo used its discretion to issue the requested subpoenas.85
The most recent case to speak to this issue, In re Letter of
Request from the Government of France, 6 was decided by the U.S.
77. Id. at 512 (affirming Manitoba, 59 F.R.D. at 629).
78. Manitoba, 488 F.2d at 512. The district court noted that nothing in the legis-
lative history indicated an intent "to include institutions whose purpose is to investi-
gate and report to the executive or legislative branches of government." Manitoba, 59
F.R.D. at 629.
79. Manitoba, 59 F.R.D. at 630.
80. Manitoba, 488 F.2d at 512.
81. 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1218.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1218-19. The Tokyo court distinguished its decision from the Manitoba
cases by noting that
[in the Manitoba cases] the letters rogatory ... were presented by an entity
whose sole power was to make recommendations to a non-judicial body
[whereas] . . . the Tokyo public prosecutor is empowered to make a final
decision as to whether or not to prosecute an individual and the Tokyo Dis-
trict Court is empowered to determine whether or not an investigation is
entitled to judicial assistance.
Id. at 1219.
86. 139 F.R.D. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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District Court for the Southern District of New York. In
France, the non-U.S. party, a French juge dinstruction, sought
documents and physical evidence pertaining to a criminal in-
vestigation.8 7 The court decided that the proceedings insti-
tuted by the Frenchjuge d'instruction were sufficiently adjudica-
tory in nature to qualify for assistance under the Statute. a8
The supporting facts included accounts of court proceedings
and a parallel criminal investigation.89 Thus, the district court
focused on the identity of the requesting party to determine
that the proceedings came within the meaning of a "foreign or
international tribunal" under the Statute.90
C. Countervailing Concerns in Granting Requests for International
Judicial Assistance
Although international comity may be a powerful motive
counselling U.S. courts to grant international assistance, it is
not the sole factor in U.S. courts' consideration of requests for
international judicial assistance. U.S. courts may also consider
the rights of those against whom the discovery is sought9" and
other considerations, such as reciprocity, admissibility and dis-
coverability.92
1. District Courts Have Broad Discretion in Deciding
Requests for International Judicial Assistance
Congress gave U.S. district courts wide discretion to con-
sider many factors in evaluating requests for international
assistance. 93  Neither the amended Statute nor its implement-
ing regulations includes standards to guide the exercise of that
discretion. 4 In the legislative history of the Statute, Congress
87. Id. at 589; see supra note 52 (discussing role of Frenchjuge dinstruction).
88. Id. at 591.
89. Id. at 589.
90. Id. at 590-91.
91. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the.
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991). Other dangers may
include overuse of discovery, indiscretion, invasions of privacy, or general abuse of
judicial processes. Note, supra note 13, at 992.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-98 (discussing district courts' discretion
and factors considered by district courts in evaluating requests for international
assistance).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (stating that "district court . . . may order" an
individual to comply with a letter rogatory) (emphasis added).
94. Id.; see Taking of Depositions in the United States Pursuant to Foreign Let-
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referred to several factors that U.S. courts might consider, in-
cluding the "nature and attitudes" of the requesting country's
government or the "character of the proceedings" in that
country or before the non-U.S. tribunal.95 A court can use its
discretion to grant or deny assistance based on an evaluation
of the probable merit of the information sought, on the identi-
ties of the litigants or the requesting parties, on the likelihood
of success of the requesting party in the non-U.S. proceeding,
or on the political importance of a case. 96
Additional factors that courts may include in the interna-
tional judicial assistance calculus may be the existence of reci-
procity and the degree to which the information requested is
admissible or discoverable in the non-U.S. jurisdiction.97
ters Rogatory, 22 C.F.R. § 92.67(a) (1991) (stating that district court "may order" an
individual to testify or produce evidence) (emphasis added); Bomstein & Levitt, supra
note 12, at 447. Some commentators have suggested that this grant of discretion is
too broad because it allows a district court to bypass some of the steps in the statu-
tory analysis. See, e.g., id. at 447-58 (discussing discretion and lack of standards);
Deutsch, supra note 13, at 185 (noting that Ninth Circuit in Tokyo did not address
"tribunal" inquiry, and may have abused its discretion).
95. S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788;
H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 9.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (stating "district court... may order [a witness]
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal") (emphasis added); see Smit, supra
note 3, at 1029; see also Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 447-50 (discussing lack of
guidelines for discretion); id. at 448 n. 84 (quoting Reporter for U.S. Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure who stated that district court could have
used its discretion to "properly have refused to order the production of evidence for
use in the Soviet Union's criminal prosecution of Gary Powers"); Deutsch, supra note
13, at 186 (arguing that India and Tokyo decisions are irreconcilable with regard to
"tribunal" issue, and either interpretation of "tribunal" could result, "[diepending
upon a court's desire to aid foreign nations" under Statute). But see Stahr, supra note
18, at 608 n.55 (criticizing notion that courts cannot make political decisions, be-
cause courts regularly decide cases with foreign policy implications); Note, supra note
13, at 993 (advocating use of discretion rather than "destructively narrow" interpre-
tation of tribunal).
97. See, e.g., In re Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(remanding for determination as to discoverability of evidence sought); In re Request
for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156
(11 th Cir. 1988) (holding district court must decide whether information would be
discoverable in non-U.S. country before proceeding with grant of assistance), cert.
denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); John Deere
Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding reciprocity is not
required for granting international judicial assistance request); In re Court of Comm'r
of Patents for the Republic of S. Afr., 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (prohibiting
non-U.S. litigant from circumventing his country's discovery rules by using U.S. let-
ters rogatory); see also Amram, supra note 12, at 28 (stating no reciprocity required);
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None of these factors, taken in isolation, is definitive, and com-
mentators and courts disagree as to the extent to which these
factors should control the outcome of a request for interna-
tional judicial assistance. 98
2. Privacy Concerns May Block the Judicial Assistance
Request
A chief reason for denying requests for international
assistance is the concern that the broader U.S. discovery rules,
combined with an equally broad grant of international assist-
ance, would render U.S. residents vulnerable to harassment by
means of international litigation.99 Alternatively, U.S. courts
fear that international parties might seek otherwise confiden-
tial information in discovery on the basis of only the vaguest
hint of wrongdoing to justify the investigation. 00 Such con-
cerns may be grouped under the rubrics of "due process"' 0 '
and "privacy." 102
II. DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
"PENDING" REQUIREMENT
The 1964 amendment to the Judicial Assistance Statute
deleted the word "pending" when it modified the Statute's re-
Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 450-52 (arguing that because Congress wanted
to stimulate reciprocity by means of 1964 amendment, it is inappropriate for courts
to consider existence of reciprocity in their evaluation of requests for assistance); id.
at 454-57 (discussing admissibility); Stahr, supra note 18, at 609-13 (contending that
federal courts should not look at discoverability in evaluating requests for interna-
tional assistance).
98. See, e.g., RJSTAU, supra note 13, § 2-1-4(7) n.5 (noting that U.S. courts may
consider existence of reciprocity as one factor in analysis). But see, e.g., Stahr, supra
note 18, at 608-09 (arguing that reciprocity is not important factor).
99. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 992-93. The United States has much broader
discovery rules than many civil law countries. See supra note 21. A lower threshold
for access to this broader discovery prompts fears of abuse. Bomstein & Levitt, supra
note 12, at 462-69.
100. See, e.g., Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156 (referring to possibility of non-
U.S. party conducting "fishing expedition").
101. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.");
see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976) ("Procedural due process im-
poses constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or
'property' interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the 5th or 14th
Amendment.").
102. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1976) ("[A] general right to
privacy . . .[is] the right to be let alone by other people.").
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quirement of "a pending judicial proceeding" to "a proceed-
ing in a foreign or international tribunal."' ' Despite the dele-
tion of the word "pending," however, U.S. courts have
adopted standards that still require some degree of develop-
ment in the non-U.S. proceeding.1' 4 Judicial interpretations of
the new phrasing differ widely.'0 5 The Ninth Circuit, with the
most relaxed standard, holds that a proceeding need not be
pending to merit judicial assistance. 0 6 The standard of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is stricter
and requires that a proceeding be in "reasonable contempla-
tion" for the request to be granted.' 017 The U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit, adopting
the strictest standard, both require that a proceeding be "very
likely to occur."'' 0
A. The Ninth Circuit: No Pending Requirement Needed
The Ninth Circuit in Tokyo implicitly acknowledged that a
proceeding need not be "pending" to merit a grant of judicial
assistance.' 0 9 In this case, the Tokyo District Public Prosecu-
103. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
104. Compare In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring that non-
U.S. proceeding be imminent) with In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecu-
tion Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring that non-U.S.
proceeding be in reasonable contemplation) and In re Request for Assistance from
Ministry*of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(requiring that non-U.S. proceeding be very likely to occur), cert. denied sub nom. Azar
v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
105. See, e.g., Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706; United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 690-91; Trinidad
& Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156.
106. In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo,Japan, 539 F.2d 1216,
1217, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1976). "Pending" means "begun, but not yet completed....
[A]n action or suit is 'pending' from its inception until the rendition of final judg-
ment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
107. United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 694.
108. Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706; Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156.
109. Tokyo District, 539 F.2d at 1218-19. The court held that "[a] purpose of the
1964 amendment was to allow federal district courts to consider Letters Rogatory
issued by foreign investigating magistrates .... Nothing has been brought to our
attention which suggests the investigation ... is 'unrelated' to 'judicial or quasi-judi-
cial controversies.' " Id. (referring to In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses
from the Court of Queen's Bench for Man., Can., 59 F.R.D. 625, 627 (N.D. Cal.),
aff'd 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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tor's office issued the letters rogatory." ° The U.S. court per-
mitted the issuance of subpoenas to enforce the request for
judicial assistance in the investigatory phase of the Japanese
proceeding despite the lack of any pending adjudicatory pro-
ceeding.'" The Ninth Circuit interpreted the amended Stat-
ute literally, and neither required an ongoing proceeding in
the Japanese courts, nor inquired into the eventual likelihood
of a judicial proceeding." 2
B. Differing Interpretations of the Pending Requirement
When the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit addressed
the significance of the deletion of "pending" from the Statute,
they professed to follow the Eleventh Circuit's standard that a
proceeding must be "very likely to occur and very soon to oc-
cur" to receive judicial assistance.' 1 3 Despite this apparent
consensus, each Circuit adopted different approaches that im-
plicate the various policy concerns that shaped their decisions
to grant or deny the requested assistance. 1 4
1. The Eleventh Circuit: A Proceeding Must Be
"Very Likely To Occur"
The Eleventh Circuit stated in In re Request for Assistance
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago t' that an ad-
judicatory proceeding in a non-U.S. court must be "very likely
to occur" to permit a U.S. court to grant a request for judicial
assistance under the Statute." 16 In Trinidad & Tobago, the Min-
ister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago sought assistance
from the U.S. Attorney in obtaining the bank records of a Trin-
idad and Tobago national in connection with a criminal inves-
110. Id. at 1218.
111. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the information requested in the letters
rogatory was for use in "in camera depositions of certain residents ... to be used in
criminal investigations and possible future criminal trials in Japan." Id. at 1217 (em-
phasis added).
112. Id. at 1218-19.
113. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Letter of Request
from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
114. Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706; United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 692.
115. 848 F.2d 1151 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of
Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
116. Id. at 1156.
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tigation of violations of the Exchange Control Act." t 7 The
Eleventh Circuit decided that the Statute did not require that a
matter be "pending" for a federal court to grant judicial assist-
ance to a non-U.S. official pursuing a request as an interested
party. ' 18
The Eleventh Circuit examined the legislative history of
the Statute, and in particular its 1964 amendment." 9 The
court noted that in amending the Statute Congress had ex-
panded prior law and reiterated the broad discretion of the
district courts in dealing with requests for international assist-
ance. 12 The court concluded that the district court judges
should determine whether a proceeding "is very likely to oc-
cur" prior to granting judicial assistance.' 2' If the U.S. court
has not decided that a proceeding "is very likely to occur," or
if the district court judge suspects that the request is a "fishing
expedition" or a vehicle for harassment, the court should deny
the request. 22 The Eleventh Circuit standard does not require
that a proceeding have started, but only that it be "very likely
to occur." 123 After finding that the Trinidadian suit was very
likely to occur, the Eleventh Circuit granted the assistance re-
quested. 124
2. The D.C. Circuit: "Reasonably Contemplated"
Proceedings
In In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the
United Kingdom,'15 the Crown Prosecution Service sought infor-
mation regarding an apartment sale by parties that it believed
to be involved in an illegal takeover of a British distillery. 6
The court in United Kingdom held that on-going British criminal
117. See id. at 1152 (citing Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Ch. 79:50). The
Trinidadian national appealed to the Eleventh Circuit the district court's sustaining
of a subpoena which enforced a letter rogatory directed at the U.S. bank in which the
national's accounts were located. Id.
118. Id. at 1155-56.
119. Id. at 1152-54.
120. Id. at 1154.
121. Id. at 1156.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
126. Id. at 687-88.
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proceedings were not required for the court to enforce the let-
ters rogatory. 2 7 The D.C. Circuit quoted the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's Trinidad & Tobago decision with approval and added that
the judicial proceedings had to be "reasonabl[y] contem-
plat[ed]."' 28  Indeed, under the D.C. Circuit approach, in
which assistance was granted for a police proceeding, a judicial
proceeding need not have started; rather, there must be a
showing that an adjudicatory proceeding "would eventu-
ate.'
1 2 9
3. The Second Circuit: A Proceeding Must Be "Imminent"
The Second Circuit, in In re Request for International Judicial
Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Republic of Brazil,' 0
127. Id. at 691. The Crown Prosecution Service was an interested party accord-
ing to the court. Id. at 689-90. At the time of the issuance of the letter rogatory, a
police investigation was being conducted. Id. at 687-89. One individual, who was
not the subject of the letters rogatory, had been arrested and charged. Id. After the
issuance of the letters, the subject of those letters was changed, and a warrant for his
arrest was issued. Id.
128. Id. at 687 (stating that "proceeding in the foreign tribunal and its contours
be in reasonable contemplation when the request is made"). Later, the court stated
that "[iun sum, we agree that, to guard against abuse of section 1782, the district
court must insist on reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be
instituted within a reasonable time." Id. at 692; see In re Letter Rogatory from the
Public Prosecutor's Office at the Regional Court of Hamburg, F.R.G., No. M-19-88,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088, at $4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1988) (stating that "pro-
ceeding in a foreign tribunal need not be actually pending at the time the request is
made, given the deletion of the word 'pending' from § 1782 when it was amended").
129. United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 691. The court stated that
[r]ecognizing that judicial proceedings in a tribunal must be within reason-
able contemplation, although they need not be pending, we turn to the
question decisive for proper application of section 1782: Was there suffi-
cient indication that a proceeding in court would eventuate in which the
evidence gathered can be weighed impartially?
Id.
130. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991). The district court had initially stayed the
enforcement of the subpoena pending further testimony via affidavits. In re Request
for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the Federative Republic of Braz.,
687 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 700 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted,
130 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991). The "threshold
issue" was whether the subpoenaed documents were "for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or internatiohal tribunal." Id. at 883. The fact that the letters rogatory were
signed by a Brazilian judge was not decisive. Id. at 885. The court noted that "[a]
foreign judge's signature, in and of itself, does not resolve the issue" of whether the
letters rogatory are for use in a foreign or international tribunal. Id. In a subsequent
proceeding, Brazil II, the district court judge declined to decide technical questions
of foreign law. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the
Federative Republic of Braz., 700 F. Supp. 723, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting John
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applied the Eleventh Circuit standard articulated in Trinidad &
Tobago, but came to the opposite conclusion, quashing the sub-
poenas that sought enforcement of the letter rogatory.' 3 1 In
Brazil, the Brazilian officials sought the bank records of six Pan-
amanian corporations suspected of affiliations with a convicted
embezzler. 32 Under the Second Circuit's holding, a district
court may grant a request for judicial assistance in advance of
the commencement of an adjudicative proceeding only if such
proceeding is imminent.133 In reaching this determination, the
Second Circuit looked to its precedent in India '4 as well as to
the lower court's opinion in the Brazil litigation.135
The Second Circuit's holding relied upon its interpreta-
tion of the 1964 amendment's deletion of the word "pending"
and the accompanying legislative history. 36 The Second Cir-
cuit found that the deletion either could have been intentional
or inadvertent because the legislature did not directly address
the deletion or the impact of that deletion. 37 The court held,
Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3rd Cir. 1985)), stay granted, 130
F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991). The court quoted the
Eleventh Circuit, defining the "pending" standard as meaning "a proceeding is very
likely to occur," and concluded that a proceeding was "probable." Id. at 724-25
(quoting In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & To-
bago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub noma. Azar v. Minister of
Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989)). The district court denied the motion to quash
the subpoena. See In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Brazil, 130 F.R.D. 283, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936
F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
131. Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706-07.
132. Id. at 704.
133. Id. at 703. The Second Circuit stated that "[e]vidence may be produced
pursuant to a letter rogatory in the absence of a pending adjudicative proceeding,
but only if such a proceeding is imminent, i.e., very likely to occur within a brief
interval from the request." Id.
134. Id. at 705; see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing In re
Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1967)).
135. In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra note 130 (dis-
cussing lower court opinions in Brazil litigation). The Second Circuit noted that the
district court had not decided that the investigation being conducted by the Brazilian
police, tax and currency officials was adjudicatory. Brazil, 936 F.2d at 705. Rather,
the district court had based its denial of the motion to quash the subpoenas on its
finding that a sufficiently adjudicatory proceeding was forthcoming. Id.
136. Brazil, 936 F.2d at 703-07.
137. Id. at 705. Moreover, the court noted that there was a "distinct possibility"
that the deletion was inadvertent. Id. at 706.
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however, that the Statute had to be read as written, and as-
serted that doing so would not contravene any expressed legis-
lative intent.' 38 The court did not consider the commentaries
by the committee members who drafted the 1964 amendment
to be dispositive,' 39 and it concluded that the lower court's
standard of "probable" was "too lenient" to protect the inter-
ests implicated by the Statute. 41 Instead, the court held that
the standard should require that adjudicative proceedings be
"imminent, i.e., very likely to occur and very soon to occur"
for the courts to grant assistance. 14 ' This standard would af-
ford judicial assistance to non-U.S. parties when they are "on
the verge" of instituting a proceeding while also protecting the
"legitimate privacy interests" of U.S. residents. 142
III. REQUESTS FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE EVALUATED UNDER A
UNIFORM STANDARD
In implementing the Statute, the D.C., Second, and Elev-
enth Circuits have variously interpreted the meaning of the
deletion of the word "pending" from the 1964 statutory
amendment, thereby engendering a spectrum of confusing
standards that alter the congressional intent implied in the lan-
138. Id. The omission "[did] no violence to any articulated congressional objec-
tive." Id.
139. Id. The Brazil court quoted Professor Smit's statement that "[iut is not nec-
essary ... for the proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but
only that the evidence is eventually to be used in such a proceeding." Id. (quoting
Smit, supra note 3, at 1026).
140. Id. The court did not explicitly list those interests. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court stated that
we think it prudent, in the absence of any indication as to why Congress
deleted the word "pending" and in view of the distinct possibility that the
deletion might have been inadvertent, to require that adjudicative proceed-
ings be imminent-very likely to occur and very soon to occur. That stan-
dard permits foreign governments to obtain judicial assistance from Ameri-
can courts when they are on the verge of instituting adjudicative proceed-
ings in which the uses of disclosed material may be carefully controlled but
avoids the risks inherent in making confidential material available to investi-
gative agencies of countries throughout the world at preliminary stages of
their inquiries. The latter course poses dangers to legitimate privacy inter-
ests of our citizenry that we do not believe Congress intended to imperil.
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guage of the Statute. 43 The standard for granting judicial
assistance under the Statute should be amended to consider
both the nature of the party requesting the evidence and the
development of the non-U.S. proceeding for which the party
seeks the assistance. Such an inquiry would therefore enforce
the congressional aim of broad judicial assistance while retain-
ing district court discretion to guard U.S. residents' interests
against potential abuse of judicial process.
A. "Imminent" Problems with the Current Standards
The current standards for evaluating letters rogatory were
articulated by the D.C., Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the deletion of the
word "pending" from the Statute.'44 When evaluating letters
rogatory, U.S. courts consider factors that include comity
among nations, reciprocity of discovery rules, the admissibility
and discoverability of the information requested, and the pro-
tection of privacy rights of U.S. residents.' 45 U.S. courts must
weigh these factors according to their own evaluation of the
importance of each in the overall scheme of international judi-
cial assistance because Congress gave the district courts broad
discretion to evaluate these factors without any guidelines gov-
erning the exercise of that discretion.i 46 These standards re-
quire the courts to make largely subjective determinations.
This subjectivity is problematic, because it leads to indefinite
standards and conflicting results, both of which may lead to
frustrated litigants and protracted, expensive litigation.
143. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Letter of Re-
quest from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 690-701 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. &
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of
Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); see supra notes 103-42 and accompanying text
(discussing "pending" standards); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); S. REP. No.
1580, supra note 7, at 1-2, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3782-83; H.R. REP. No.
1052, supra note 7, at 2-4.
144. See supra notes 103- 42 and accompanying text (discussing standards for de-
letion of "pending").
145. See supra notes 3, 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing comity, discov-
erability, and admissability).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988); see Deutsch, supra note 13, at 188-89 (noting
that few cases address scope of courts' discretion in international judicial assistance).
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1. The Current Standards Require Use of Courts' Discretion
The circuit courts' different standards reflect the broad
discretion granted by Congress to the district courts in the
1964 amendment. 147 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Tokyo
read and applied the amendment as it was written, without ad-
ding terms clarifying the significance of the deletion of the
word "pending."' 148 While the Eleventh Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit standards usually result in grants of judicial assistance,
the Second Circuit's stricter approach has resulted in the de-
nial of assistance. 14
9
One of the most important factors that U.S. courts con-
sider in the "pending" analyses is the nature of the requesting
party.' 5 ° In Trinidad & Tobago, the Eleventh Circuit considered
the Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago to be an
"interested party" and granted judicial assistance.'' The
Ninth Circuit, in Tokyo, granted assistance to a purely
prosecutorial party, also an interested person.'5 2 Likewise, the
D.C. Circuit granted assistance to the U.K. Crown Prosecution
Service, a body held to be an interested party. 5 3 However, the
147. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3788-89; H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 9-10.
148. In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216,
1219 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing Tokyo
and its analysis of statutory deletion of pending).
149. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying judicial
assistance); In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870
F.2d 686, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (granting judicial assistance); In re Request for
Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156
(11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005
(1989) (granting judicial assistance).
150. See, e.g., Brazil, 936 F.2d at 705; United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 689-90; Trinidad
& Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155; Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219.
151. Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155; see supra notes 70-74 and accompany-
ing text (discussing interested persons under Statute). In Trinidad & Tobago, the U.S.
Department ofJustice sought the enforcement of letters rogatory in furtherance of a
criminal investigation involving possible currency control violations. Trinidad & To-
bago, 848 F.2d at 1152. The court did not make a de novo determination as to the
standard to be used in determining whether to grant a request for international judi-
cial assistance from an interested person but considered only whether the district
court had abused its discretion. Id. at 1154-55.
152. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1218-19. The Ninth Circuit granted assistance to the
Tokyo court, which had sent the letters rogatory at the request of the Tokyo Public
Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 1218.
153. United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 690. The D.C. Circuit standard is "reasonable
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Second Circuit, in Brazil, denied judicial assistance to a Brazil-
ian court that issued letters rogatory on behalf of a Brazilian
prosecutor. '
54
These results are contradictory when one considers that a
"tribunal" is defined as a disinterested and adjudicatory body,
whereas an "interested party" has an institutional interest in
the outcome of the litigation.' 55  The Statute should be
amended so that if a U.S. court finds that a "tribunal" is the
source of the request forjudicial assistance, the U.S. resident's
rights should be protected because of the impartial and adjudi-
catory nature of the proceeding. 56 In contrast, a request from
an interested party does not necessarily include the same pro-
cedural safeguards of impartiality or neutrality. 57  The re-
quested assistance thus should be granted more readily to a
requesting tribunal than to an interested person in light of the
countervailing interests in independent judicial review and in-
dividual privacy. 58
The distinction between a "tribunal" and an "interested
person" is not a false one.' 59 To ignore the difference between
a tribunal and an interested party devalues the countervailing
interests that balance an evaluation of a request for judicial
contemplation" of an applicable proceeding. Id. at 691. The D.C. Circuit refused to
allow a "potential target" of a letter rogatory to prohibit the appointment of an en-
forcing commission. Id. at 689.
154. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir., 1991).
155. See, e.g., In the Matter of Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspec-
tion of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1019-21 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing adjudi-
cative qualities of tribunal).
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing "interested
party").
158. See, e.g., Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706 (discussing privacy interests of U.S. resi-
dents faced with internationally-based discovery request); India, 385 F.2d at 1019-21
(discussing tribunal).
159. Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 445. The authors, on the contrary,
argue that considerations of judicial economy support
grantfing] the request when presented, thereby recognizing that a prosecu-
tor would have access to the information once the case is filed, either be-
cause he would then be a litigant in a pending proceeding or because the
tribunal itself would make the request. Simply put, to deny a particular tri-
bunal's section 1782 request for information when that request is presented
prior to trial is merely to advocate form over substance.
799
800 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:772
assistance.t6 Additionally, combining "tribunals" and "inter-
ested persons" discounts the possibility of international assist-
ance used as an abuse ofjudicial process that may violate U.S.
residents' rights that are protected by the Statute itself.1 6 '
In the reports considered and adopted by the Congress
addressing the 1964 amendments to the Statute, Congress en-
dorsed a position that favored the granting of requests for in-
ternational judicial assistance with references to comity and in-
ternational cooperation.162 To effectuate the stated congres-
sional intent, U.S. courts evaluate the non-U.S. proceeding and
U.S. residents' privacy rights that protect them from unneces-
sary or improper discovery. 163 This evaluation, however, must
be made in the context of Congress's "pro-assistance" prefer-
ence to ensure international reciprocity in the exchange of in-
formation. 6 4
2. Current Interpretations of the Statute Lend Themselves
to Judicial Legislation
The interpretations of the deletion of the word "pending"
have produced inexact standards that lead to conflicting re-
sults among the courts. 165 The terms used to qualify the dele-
tion are inherently subjective and can lead, therefore, to judi-
160. See supra note 96 (discussing interests that balance interests that favor
granting assistance).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988) (stating, in pertinent part, that "[a] person may
not be compelled to give his testimony... in violation of any legally applicable privi-
lege"); see Note, supra note 13, at 992.
162. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 1-3, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792-94 (quoting letter from Rep. Oscar Cox, Chairman of Commis-
sion on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, to John McCormack, Speaker of
the House (May 28, 1963)); see also Letter Brief, supra note 4 (discussing policy con-
siderations that support grant ofjudicial assistance).
163. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
164. See Letter Brief, supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that "[i]f the U.S. does not itself
provide international legal assistance ... the availability of this assistance to persons
within the United States is threatened"); Smit, supra note 3, at 1029.
165. See infra notes 103-42 and accompanying text (discussing standards for in-
terpreting statutory deletion). Compare Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706 (denying assistance to
Brazilian prosecutors that had Brazilian court's assistance in issuing letter rogatory)
with In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1217-
18 (9th Cir. 1976) (granting assistance to Japanese prosecutor that had Japanese
court's assistance in issuing letter rogatory).
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cial legislation.166 Courts have not precisely defined the terms,
such as "imminent," with which they have explained the dele-
tion of the word "pending" from the Statute. 167 When dis-
cussing the "pending" deletion, courts have used "even-
tual,"' "reasonably contemplated,"6 ,,probable,",17' and
"very likely to occur and very soon to occur."' 17 ' These addi-
tional terms do not clarify the meaning of the deletion of
"pending;" instead, they merely muddy already murky waters.
B. A Proposed Uniform Standard
The standards for granting international judicial assist-
ance under the Statute are inherently subjective and lead to
uncertainty in the application of the Statute to requests for
assistance. 72 U.S. courts need to adopt a uniform standard.
Absent further clarification of congressional intent regarding
the deletion of the word "pending" from the Statute, U.S.
courts should rely on the legislative intent underlying the 1964
statutory amendments as a whole. 73
The uniform standard proposed here employs a two-part
test under which the interpretation of the deletion of the word
"pending" would hinge on a prior analysis of the nature of the
166. Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 448-49 (discussing judicial approaches
to Statute).
167. Compare Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706 (defining "imminent" as "very likely to oc-
cur and very soon to occur") with In re Request for Assistance from the Ministry of
Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988) (describing proceedings as
"imminent"), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 U.S. 1005
(1989).
168. In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870
F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
169. Id.
170. In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the Feder-
ative Republic of Braz., 700 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130
F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
171. In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the Feder-
ative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
172. See supra notes 147-58 (discussing discretionary aspects of courts' analyses
of requests for international judicial assistance).
173. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 2, 7-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3783, 3788-89; H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 4, 8-9. Congress, when it
passed the 1964 statutory amendments, articulated two aims. Id. First, Congress
wanted to provide district courts broad discretion in considering requests for inter-
national judicial assistance. Id. Second, it wanted to liberalize current standards for
granting judicial assistance in the hope that a more liberal U.S. policy regarding in-
ternational discovery would prompt other nations to reciprocate in kind. Id.
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party seeking the international judicial assistance. First, the
courts should perform a "tribunal" analysis to determine
whether the party requesting the letters rogatory represents a
"tribunal" or an "interested person. "174 Depending on this
determination, the court should apply one of two different
standards to determine the stage of development of the pro-
ceedings in the non-U.S. forum.
If the court finds that the entity requesting judicial assist:
ance is a tribunal,'then an impartial adjudicatory body is con-
sidered to be conducting or overseeing the proceeding.' 75 A
tribunal, by definition, does not have an "institutional inter-
est" in the outcome of the proceeding.' 76 When the request-
ing party is adjudicatory, the U.S. courts may grant requests
for assistance for proceedings that are less developed because
the impartiality of the adjudicatory body protects U.S. resi-
dents from harassment or "fishing expeditions."'' 77 Using this
relaxed standard, the U.S. district courts, at their discretion,
may determine whether proceedings in the non-U.S. tribunal
are "probable."' 7 ' Determining whether a proceeding is prob-
able does not require a U.S. court to predict when the non-
U.S. proceeding will start. Rather, "probable" merely implies
that a proceeding need not be pending. 79
When the district court defines the non-U.S. party as a tri-
bunal, the district court acknowledges that a sufficient adjudi-
catory process has commenced or become "pending."'' 8 0 The
court should grant assistance if it finds that proceedings are
174. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 687 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 700 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1991). To some extent, the courts already perform this type of analysis. Id.
(requesting affidavits addressing questions of Brazilian law, including whether Brazil-
ian judge automatically forwarded letter rogatory, or whether she had more active
role in proceeding).
175. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the
Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1967).
176. See id.
177. In re Request for Assistance from the Ministry of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d
1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488
U.S. 1005 (1989).
178. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 700 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130 F.R.D.
283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
179. See supra note 106 (defining "pending").
180. In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Gov't of
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only probable. The added safeguard of the impartial proceed-
ing would help counter the subjective quality of a "probable"
standard.
In contrast, if the court decides that the party seeking judi-
cial assistance is not a tribunal but rather an "interested
party," including prosecutors with an institutional interest in
the outcome of the proceeding, the courts should apply a more
rigorous standard. For example, the court should require the
requesting party to present sufficient proof that an adjudica-
tory proceeding is "'Very likely to occur very soon." In other
words, the requesting party should prove that it has a reason-
able basis for its request-a basis supported by more than im-
plication, innuendo, or circtimstance. The uniform standard
thus adheres more closely to the expressed, though sparse,
congressional intent behind the Statute because it focuses on
the overall result rather than individual textual changes.
C. Future Implications for International Judicial Assistance
This two-prong test should more efficiently safeguard the
privacy interests of U.S. residents to which the Second Circuit
referred in Brazil.'8 ' Allowing "interested persons" and
prosecutorial bodies to pursue letters rogatory will enforce the
congressional intent to further international reciprocity and to
broaden the category of parties to whom judicial assistance is
available.'" 2 By requiring interested parties to meet a higher
standard of development in their non-U.S. proceeding, con-
gressional objectives are still met in most cases and the privacy
rights of U.S. residents are more fully protected."8 3 Such an
inquiry should allow U.S. courts to determine that there is
India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1967); In re Letter of Request from the Gov-
ernment of France, 139 F.R.D. 588, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
181. In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
182. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3782-83; H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 9 (expanding scope of parties that can
seek international judicial assistance under Statute); see also supra notes 70-74 and
accompanying text (discussing interested persons under Statute).
183. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 7, at 7-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3782-83; H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra note 7, at 9 (expanding scope of parties that can
seek international judicial assistance under Statute); see also Brazil, 936 F.2d at 706
(noting need to protect U.S. residents' privacy rights in granting international judi-
cial assistance under Statute); supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing
interested persons under Statute).
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enough evidence in the non-U.S. forum to commence a pro-
ceeding, although additional evidence may be necessary from
the United States to complete the proceeding.
1. The Uniform Standard Provides a Structure for the
District Courts' Analysis
a. District Courts Must Analyze the Nature of
the Requesting Party
U.S. district courts, in deciding requests for international
judicial assistance under the uniform standard, must look not
at the name of the requesting party, but at the nature of the
requesting party.' 8 4 This would ensure that non-U.S. parties
that are granted assistance under the relaxed "probable" stan-
dard in fact possess the procedural protections implied by the
title "tribunal."' 85 Since the district court's analysis for a grant
of assistance involves a determination of whether the request-
ing party possesses the procedural safeguards implicit in its
structure, the U.S. courts must look at the degree of involve-
ment that the tribunal has in the non-U.S. proceeding."86 For
example, the U.S. court must decide whether the requesting
tribunal actively oversees the investigatory aspects of the non-
U.S. proceeding, as a Frenchjuge dinstruction does, or whether
the non-U.S. tribunal automatically forwards the letter roga-
tory on behalf of a prosecutorial body without interacting in
the proceeding. 8 7 The burden of proof should fall on the
party requesting the information, not the U.S. district court.1
8 8
Such an inquiry does not place an undue burden on the district
courts. At present, the district courts make similar analyses of
non-U.S. fora in decidingforum non conveniens motions.'
8 9
184. See, e.g., In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 687 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 700 F. Supp.
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702
(2d Cir. 1991).
185. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the
Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1967) (defining "tribunal" in terms
of its functions).
186. See, e.g., Brazil, 687 F. Supp. at 885.
187. Id.
188. Id. For example, in Brazil, the district court judge requested affidavits on
Brazilian law to determine the degree of the Brazilian judge's involvement with the
tax and currency investigations. Id.
189. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing
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b. District Courts Must Analyze the Development of the
Non-U.S. Proceeding
The uniform test might compel U.S. courts to decide
questions of non-U.S. law in making determinations regarding
the sufficiency of the non-U.S. proceeding. Because the dis-
trict court must determine when a non-U.S. party may receive
access to information for use in a non-U.S. proceeding, the dis-
trict court may find itself examining details of the non-U.S. fo-
rum's judicial procedure in an attempt to discover the degree
of the proceeding's development. Such determinations cur-
rently are made by the district courts in deciding requests for
judicial assistance. 9 ° Under the uniform procedure, the party
requesting the assistance should bear the burden of proving
that it possesses the necessary degree of procedural develop-
ment. This is the most logical solution because it is the re-
questing party that possesses the most accurate knowledge of
its own procedures and the information that it still requires.
With such information at its disposal, the party requesting the
information should have little difficulty convincing a U.S. court
of the necessity of its request.
2. Adoption of the Uniform Standard Protects the Rights of
U.S. Residents
The adoption of the uniform standard would help to safe-
guard U.S. residents' privacy rights in two ways. First, stand-
ardization of the inquiry would result in more predictable out-
comes for all parties. U.S. residents who seek to avoid such
requests will know what information will be required to quash
a letter rogatory by addressing the non-U.S. party's character-
istics. This foresight will enable U.S. residents to prepare
themselves for litigation by knowing what they will need to
wrongful death action arising from plane crash in Scotland from federal court on
forum non conveniens grounds). The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens re-
mains applicable where an alternative forum exists in a foreign country. Id. at 256. A
district court may exercise discretion regarding jurisdiction when an alternative fo-
rum would have jurisdiction and a trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum would be dis-
proportionately oppressive or administratively problematic for the court. Id. at 241.
190. In re Request for Int'lJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federa-
tive Republic of Braz., 687 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 700 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), stay granted, 130 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1991) (requesting affidavits on questions of Brazilian law to determine nature of
non-U.S. proceeding).
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prevail. Second, by standardizing the inquiry, U.S. residents
become insulated from unwarranted international discovery
actions. To compel the U.S resident to testify or provide evi-
dence, the non-U.S. proceeding must either be well-developed
with a clear need for such testimony, or the proceeding must
be overseen by an impartial adjudicatory body that would not
institute such proceedings heedlessly.
One might argue that the uniform test reads too much
into the deletion of "pending" and wrongly infers congres-
sional intent. Congress, however, did not directly address
these issues.' 9 ' The courts, therefore, must implement the
amended Statute to effectuate the expressed intent of Con-
gress while also protecting the rights of U.S. citizens. 9 ' In-
deed, it is evident from the decisions since the promulgation of
the 1964 amendments that the courts have not always provided
"more efficient, more effective, and more economical" interna-
tional judicial assistance.' The uniform standard set forth
here accomplishes these goals by clearly structuring the judi-
cial inquiry.
3. The Uniform Standard Clarifies Non-U.S. Parties' Rights
Non-U.S. parties will also benefit from the improved pre-
dictability of the uniform standard. The two-prong test will
more clearly demarcate the information that non-U.S. parties
must supply to parties requesting international judicial assist-
ance. The "unbridled discretion" of the district courts has led
to a collection of standards that differs from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction. 1 4 This jurisdictional patchwork confuses and frus-
trates non-U.S. parties seeking evidence in the United States
because a similar request might be treated differently in neigh-
191. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing potential absence
of congressional intent behind -adoption of 1964 amendments).
192. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing potential absence
of congressional intent behind adoption of 1964 amendments); supra note 5 (quoting
text of Statute).
193. H.R. REP. No. 1052, supra 'note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3792 (quoting letter from Rep. Oscar Cox, Chairman of Commission on Interna-
tional Rules of Judiiial Procedure, to John McCormack, Speaker of the House (May
28, 1963)).
194. See, e.g., Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 438 (discussing district court
discretion); see supra notes 103-42 (discussing different standards for deletion of word
"pending" from. Statute).
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boring states.195 Thus, the uniform standard must be adopted
to realize fully Congress's aspiration to provide international
judicial assistance.
CONCLUSION
U.S. courts should restructure the statutory analysis to re-
affirm the district courts' broad discretion while promoting
reciprocity in international judicial assistance. Such a restruc-
turing should be guided by the legislative intent as expressed
in the 1964 amendments in their entirety. To most fully ac-
complish these dual goals, the statutory analysis should be
conducted in two stages. Therefore, courts should first deter-
mine whether a party requesting judicial assistance is an adju-
dicative tribunal or an interested person. The outcome of this
analysis should direct the courts to apply either a more relaxed
standard of "probable" or the stricter standard of "imminent,"
with proof that the request is not a "fishing expedition." Such
a test would encourage reciprocity while safeguarding the pri-
vacy rights of U.S. residents. Such a uniform standard would
enable courts and litigants, both U.S. and foreign, to anticipate
more clearly the outcome of a request for international judicial
.assistance under the Statute.
Eileen P. McCarthy*
195. Compare In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Braz., 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991) with In re Letters Rogatory
from the Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Fordham University.
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